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THE CASE OF TIERNEY v. COHEN
E. H. FOLEY, JR.t
D RY as discarded Christmas trees are cases dealing with the inter-
pretation and construction of statutes. The case of Tierney v.
Cohen,1 decided by the Court of Appeals of the state of New York on
October 22, 1935 is no exception. The case deals solely with the power
of the City of New York to finance the construction of a municipal self-
liquidating electric plant, without recourse to taxation and without a
pledge of the faith dnd credit of the City to the payment of the bonds
proposed to be issued for such purpose.
The Tierney Case lays down no new rule of law. It pronounces no
novel judicial doctrine. It enunciates no new method for interpreting
or construing a statute. The holding of the case will stimulate no con-
troversial discussion. The attention of the entire country was attracted,
however, by the prospect of the nation's largest city constructing and
operating a yardstick electric light, heat and power plant to be operated
in direct competition with privately owned public service companies.
There are occasions when a court is called upon to construe a statute
which is susceptible to more than one interpretation and when the court's
own views on the public policy underlying the statute perhaps can not
be wholly ignored. But an analysis of the situation in respect of the
attempt by the City of New York to establish a municipal self-liquidating
electric plant will reveal that the statutes here in question admitted of
only one reasonable interpretation. Even Mayor LaGuardia refrained
from questioning the soundness of the construction placed upon the
statute by the Court of Appeals. The Mayor simply asserted that "The
way is now open for a clarification of the law-a law to be written for
the interests of the city and consumers and not for the utility companies."12
It seems fair to say that the Mayor's vigorous prosecution of an appeal
was dictated more by a desire to bring to public notice the inadequacy
of the statute rather than to correct an erroneous judicial decision.
The General City Law contains this clear and unequivocal mandate:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law or ordi-
nance a city shall have no power to issue obligations to which it has not pledged
its faith and credit for payment of the principal and interest thereof.2u
-t Director, Legal Division, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works.
1. Matter of Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N. Y. 464, 193 N. E. 225 (1935).
2. N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1935, at 2.
3. Art. 2-A, § 20 (5). This provision was added to the General City Law by N. Y.
Laws 1933, c. 390.
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The Local Law of the City of New York4 held invalid in the Tierney
Case purported to create an "authority" and purported to authorize such
"authority" to establish, construct and operate a municipal electric plant
on a site to be provided and owned by the City of New York.' It
purported to provide for a plant with a capacity of 140,000 kilowatts to
a cost not to exceed $49,500,000 which would supply electricity to public
and private consumers within the territorial limits of the City.' It pur-
ported to give the "authority" power to issue bonds in an amount not to
exceed $49,500,000 which might be a lien upon the plant and the facilities
(and the income thereof) acquired or constructed with the proceeds of
the bonds.7
It defined the "authority" as "an agency or other instrumentality of
the City of New York to perform the functions and carry out the pur-
poses" described in the Local Law.8 In violation of the mandate of the
General City Law, the Local Law then purported to provide expressly
that the faith and credit of the City was not to be pledged to the pay-
ment of the bonds to be issued by the "authority"' and that the City
would never be liable for any deficit arising from the operation of the
proposed electric plant.10
Could there have been any doubt that bonds issued by such an agency
or instrumentality would be held to constitute obligations of the City
to which under the General City Law the faith and credit of the City
should have been pledged? Could there have been any doubt that the
New York Supreme Court would grant an order of peremptory mandamus
to compel the Board of Elections to remove from the ballot the question
which the Local Law directed should be submitted to the electorate and
that such order would be affirmed by the Appellate Division and by the
Court of Appeals? Could there have been any doubt from the very
beginning that under the procedure followed by the City, the people
necessarily would be denied an opportunity to express themselves on the
question of the construction of a municipal electric plant?11
4. N. Y. City Local Laws 1935, No. 25.
5. Id. §2.
6. Id. §§ 2, 3.
7. Id. §4.
8. Id. § I (d).
9. Id.§4.
10. Id. § 5.
11. Edward J. Tierney brought a proceeding against the Board of Elections of the
City of New York for a peremptory mandamus order to compel the Board to remove
from the ballots to be used at the next general election the question whether Local Act
No. 25 should be approved. John A. Sherman sought a mandamus order against the
Board of Elections, asking for a direction to the City Clerk to reframe the proposition for
the submission of Local Act No. 25. The Sherman petition was denied at the same time
as the Tierney petition was granted and at such time the two proceedings were consolidated.
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed both orders of the supreme court, and
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The City relied upon Article 14-A of the General Municipal Law -
for the power to issue bonds of an "authority" to which the faith and
credit of the City would not be pledged. ' This Article authorizes any
county, city, town or village to construct and operate an electric light,
heat and power plant within or without its territorial limits for the pur-
pose of furnishing services to itself or its inhabitants. 4 It requires that
the proposed method of acquiring such a utility, together with the max-
imum and estimated costs thereof, the plan for financing the utility, and
the method of furnishing the services thereof, be submitted for the
approval of the electors of the county, city, town or village at a general
or a special election. 5 It permits the cost of such a utility to be financed
in whole or in part by levying taxes or by the issuance of bonds in the
same manner as taxes are levied or bonds are issued for any permanent
improvements pursuant to existing law.10
Among the provisions of the Article is one under which a local law
submitting a proposition to the people may provide "a different method
or authority or agency" for the purpose of constructing the utility. This
language was the cornerstone of the City's case.' It is patent that this
language was not intended to authorize the City to create an independent
public corporation with power to borrow money and issue bonds upon
its own credit. And when this language is considered in the light of
the qualifying phrase contained in the same section "not inconsistent
with the state law applicable thereto""' the weakness of the City's case
is brought into bold relief. It is obvious that a local law such as that
enacted by the City of New York attempting to authorize an agency of
the City to issue bonds without pledging the faith and credit of the City
is inconsistent with the General City Law. One need not have been a
prophet to have predicted that the Court of Appeals would hold that a
local law inconsistent with the General City Law was not within the
compass of the powers conferred upon the City of New York by Article
14-A of the General Municipal Law.
granted Tierney leave to appeal. Leave to appeal from the decision of the Appllate
Division was not sought by Sherman. The New York Edison Company brought a tax-
payer's action to restrain the city from spending any funds for the purpose of having the
proposition submitted to a referendum or from acting in any other way under Local Act
No. 25. A temporary injunction was granted. The order was affirmed by the Appellate
Division, which granted leave to appeal. The appeals from the orders on the Tierney
petition and the Edison petition were argued before the Court of Appeals at the same time.
12. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 281.
13. N. Y. City Local Laws 1935, No. 25, § 6.
14. N. Y. Ga.,. ,fru. LAw (1934) § 360 (2).
15. Id. § 360 (3), (4).
16. Id. § 362.
17. Brief for Appellants, pp. 28-46, Matter of Tierney v. Cohen, 263 N. Y. 464.
198 N. E. 225 (1935).
18. N. Y. GEi. Alux. LAW (1934) § 363.
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Even if the General City Law had not expressly prohibited the issuance
of bonds to which the faith and credit of the City were not pledged,
bonds issued under Article 14-A of the General Municipal Law would,
under Article 2 of the General Municipal Law, probably have been held
to constitute a charge upon the taxing power of the City. In the latter
Article the General Municipal Law provides that when for any reason
any portion of the principal or interest due upon the bonds of a municipal
corporation shall not have been paid "the same shall be assessed, levied
and collected at the first assessment and collection of taxes by such
corporation." 19
It is a general and indisputable proposition of law that when the
legislature has authorized a municipal corporation to exercise a power
and has prescribed a particular manner for its exercise, the right to exer-
cise such power in any other manner can not be implied.2" The sole
power vested in the City of New York to finance a municipal electric
plant for the purpose of serving private as well as public consumers is
found in Article 14-A of the General Municipal Law. The particular
manner prescribed by the legislature for the exercise of this power is
the issuance of bonds under the General Municipal Law which by its
own terms affirmatively provides that bonds issued thereunder shall be
a charge upon the taxing power.2 Attempts by municipal corporations
in states other than New York to finance revenue-producing public im-
provements by the issuance of bonds payable solely from the income
of such improvements, where the only method prescribed by the legis-
lature for financing such improvements is by the issuance of bonds pay-
able from taxes, likewise have been repulsed by the courts of those
jurisdictions.2
The want of power in the City of New York to construct a municipal
electric plant on a self-liquidating basis to serve private as well as public
consumers may be remedied easily by the legislature. The enabling
legislation may take two forms. One form would be the creation of a
Power Authority foi the City analogous to the power authority of the
state of New York.' That a portion of the act creating the Albany
Light, Heat and Power Authority24 has been recently held by the Court
19. N. Y. GEN. MUN. LAW (1909) § 7.
20. 1 DIrLoN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS (5th ed. 1911) §§ 237-239; 1 MCQuILLIN, MUNI-
cn'AL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 370; see Tooke, Construction and Operation of Municipal
Powers (1933) 7 T~mTPLE L. Q. 267.
21. See note 19, supra.
22. See for example Kansas Power Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 45 P. (2d) 872
(Kan. 1935); State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. McWilliams, 74 S. W. (2d) 363 (Mo.
1934); Van Eaton v. Town of Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N. W. 475 (1930); Hesse v. City
of Watertown, 57 S. D. 325, 232 N. W. 53 (1930).
23. N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 772.
24. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 842.
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of Appeals to be unconstitutional25 need cause no concern. The Albany
Authority Act failed to take into account the sharp distinction which
the New York courts have drawn between a civil subdivision of the
state and an independent public corporation. 0 The line of cleavage had
recently been drawn by the Court of Appeals in sustaining the consti-
tutionality of the legislation creating the Buffalo Sewer Authorit in
Robertson v. Zimmerman.28  Another form which the legislation might
take would be the delegation of power to the City to construct and
finance on a self-liquidating basis a municipal electric plant to serve
private as well as public consumers. The General Municipal Law in
Article 14-C 29 confers power upon counties, towns, cities and villages to
construct revenue-producing undertakings of many types, not including,
however, electric plants.30 This Article confers power to finance such
undertakings by the issuance of bonds payable solely from the revenues
of such undertakings,"' and provides that the holders of such bonds shall
have no right to compel any exercise of the taxing power to pay the
principal or interest thereof.2- A simple amendment to the definition
of the term "undertaking" in that Article to include electric plants would
suffice. An equally effective solution would be an amendment to the
Greater New York Charter to authorize the construction and financing
of a light, heat and power plant as a self-liquidating enterprise. Such
an amendment might be made by inserting a chapter in the Greater
New York Charter substantially in the form of Article 14-C of the Gen-
eral Municipal Law.
If, in enacting the local law held invalid in Tierney v. Cohen, the
proponents of the municipal electric plant had merely intended to estab-
lish a yardstick whereby the cost of the production and transmission of
electric energy could be measured accurately for purposes of comparison
with the cost alleged by the public service companies, it is difficult to
understand why such a method was employed. Under existing law the
City has ample authority to construct and finance a municipal electric
plant to serve itself (but not private consumers) without submitting the
proposition to a city-wide election.
The General City Law in Article 2-A specifically authorizes all cities
to construct "lighting systems, for lighting streets, public buildings and
25. The act creating the Albany Light, Heat and Power Authority was held uncon-
stitutional in part in Gaynor v. Mlarohn, 268 N. Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (1935).
26. Ibid.; cf. Village of Kenmore v. County of Erie, 252 N. Y. 437, 169 N. E. 637
(1930); Town of Amherst v. County of Erie, 260 N. Y. 361, 183 N. E. 851 (1933).
27. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 349.
28. 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (1935).
29. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 525.
30. N. Y. GFN. Mut,. LAw (1935) § 401 (a).
31. Id. §403.
32. Id. § 409.
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public places." 3 The construction of an electric light plant to serve the
City's agencies and departments is therefore a proper city purpose. The
Greater New York Charter in Section 169-c specifically authorizes the
City by resolution of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment to issue
bonds for the purpose of financing the construction of any improvement
which is a city purpose. 4 The only limitation is that the improvement
must be included in the federal public works program.25 Although such
bonds would constitute debts of the City, nevertheless, the City has ample
additional borrowing power under the Constitution.s3
In conclusion, therefore, it should be emphasized that the decision in
the Tierney Case does not preclude either:
(1) The issuance by the City of New York, without a vote of
the people, of bonds pledging its faith and credit to finance a
municipal power plant for its own uses and purposes; or
(2) The issuance by the City of New York, with a vote of the
people, of bonds pledging its faith and credit to finance an
electric power plant for private as well as public consumers.
All that the Tierney Case decides is that the City of New York can
not issue bonds to finance a power plant for public and private consumers,
under existing law, payable solely from the earnings of the plant. There
are no constitutional barriers in the way of appropriate enabling legis-
lation.
33. N. Y. GmN. C=ry LAW (1927) § 20 (7).
34. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 349, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 871.
35. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 871, § 1.
36. N. Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10. As of the close of business Oct. 1, 1935, the city
had a net debt incurring power of $317,169,137 of which $138,044,406 had been reserved
for specific purposes, leaving a total of $179,124,731 as the city's unreserved margin of
debt incurring power available for additional specific authorizations for any municipal pur-
pose. See Statement of the Constitutional Debt Incurring Power of the City, issued by
the Comptroller of City of New York, Aug. 30, 1935, supplemented by Statement of
Oct. 25, 1935.
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